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NOTES
Conflicts of Interest and the Changing Concept of Marriage:
The Congressional Compromise
The number of women, including married women, 1 seeking
prominent positions in American business and government has increased rapidly in recent years, 2 and this development raises serious
questions regarding potential conflicts of interest between spouses
who work either in related areas of the public and private sectors
or solely within the public sector. Specifically, when one spouse is
a member of Congress, conflicts of interest can occur if the other
spouse occupies a high-level position in private industry3 or in the
executive branch of the government. 4 This Note examines the
potential dangers in these employment arrangements of members of
Congress and their spouses to determine whether special constraints
are warranted to combat potential conflicts of interest. 5 In so doing
1. Increasing numbers of married women are seeking employment. See The
American Family: Can It Survive Today's Shocks?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 27, 1975, at 30 [hereinafter cited as The American Family].
2. During the nation's formative years, few women held influential roles in government. 1 E. JAMES, NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950, at xviii-xxii (1974).
No women held seats in the First (1789-1791), Twentieth (1827-1829), Fortieth
(1867-1869), or Sixtieth (1907-1909) Congresses, and only eight women, all in
the House, were members of the Eightieth Congress (1947-1949). Despite increased
political activity by women, they are still a small minority in Congress. The Ninetythird Congress (1973-1975) included fourteen women, and the Ninety-fifth Congress
(1977) has eighteen. At least one source contends that women still are "barely
represented in the public life of the nation." CENTER FOR THE AMERICAN WOMAN
AND POLITICS, WOMEN IN PUBLIC OFFICE xix (1976).
3. For example, in January 1976, Marion Javits resigned from a lucrative position
with an advertising agency for which she handled the account of the governmentowned airline of Iran. Her action was apparently in response to concerns raised
by the press about potential conflicts of interest between her employment and the
position of her husband, Sen. Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.), the ranking Republican on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
4. For example, Elizabeth Hanford Dole, wife of Sen. Robert Dole (R.-Kan.),
is a member of the Federal Trade Commission. Commissioner Dole has stated that
she perceives no conflict of interest in this arrangement. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1976,
§ 1, at 48, col. 1. However, Rep. John E. Moss (D.-Cal.), Chairman of the House
Commerce Oversight Committee, and Rep. Joe L. Evins (D.-Tenn.), Chairman of
the House Small Business Committee, called on Commissioner ·Dole either to resign
from the Commission or to refrain from participating in her husband's 1976 vicepresidential campaign. [1976] .ANTimuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 782 at
A-5. In a speech on the floor of the House, Rep. Evins stated, "I am sympathetic
with Mrs. Dole to the situation confronting her-loyalty to her husband or loyalty
to the Commission." Id. at A-6.
5. It should be noted that, although this Note specifically deals only with con-
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it scrutinizes the degree to which our society views marital partners as autonomous, the interests protected by current conflict-ofinterest regulations, and the extent to which the rigor of general conflict provisions has been mitigated with respect to the marital relationship. Concluding that safeguards against conflicts of interest are
necessary in husband-wife employment situations involving a member of Congress, the Note examines the possible forms such regulation could take and recommends the creation of an independent
ethics commission.

I.

THE AMERICAN CoNCEPT OF MARRIAGE

The effort to determine the present societal view on the degree
of autonomy of spouses 6 is aided by a brief examination of the historical evolution of the marital relationship. At English common
law, unmarried women, although subject to some unequal treatment,
had property and contractual rights almost coextensive with those of
men. 7 It was the rite of marriage that resulted in the loss of many
rights and privileges for the woman. 8 Because the English common
flicts of interest occurring where one spouse is a member of Congress, similar concerns arise from other situations in which at least one spouse is employed by the
federal, state, or local government. Thus, many of the conclusions presented in this
Note also may be applicable to those situations.
6. Marriage is certainly a very personal relati9nship, and thus its nature varies
greatly among couples depending upon the perceptions of the individual participants,
Indeed, the institution of marriage is under attack as individuals attempt to redesign
the relationship to reflect better the equality of the partners. See Note, Interspousal
Contracts: The Potential for Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 185
(1975). This situation is epitomized by the attempts to define the marital relationship in contractual terms that are designed to permit the marriage to take any
form permissible under contract law. See generally id.
The many combinations that could emanate from this scheme create problems
in defining "marriage." Although Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971),
affirmed the state power to regulate certain facets of marriage, "it should be borne
in mind that marriages are, and will continue to be, based more on personal relationships than upon laws." Lexcen, The Equal Rights Amendment, 31 FED. B.J. 247,
253 (1972).
Furthermore, in attempting to discover the current American view on the independence of partners in marriage, it must be recognized that there is no federal policy
regarding marriage. In United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized that the regulation of marriage is generally reserved to the
states and cautioned against the imposition of any federal regulation unless a "federal interest" exists that "justifies invading the peculiarly local jurisdiction of these
States, in disregard of their laws." 382 U.S. at 353. Moreover, the Court found
interstate differences in the regulation of marriage to be products of "important and
carefully evolved state arrangements designed to serve multiple purposes." 382 U.S.
at 353. Yazell reveals the enormous difficulty in identifying a national legal concept
of marriage. Such matters have been left to the discretion of the states, which have
developed a variety of differing concepts of the relationship. As a result, there is
a need for qualification of any conclusions about a national concept of marriage.
7. See L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAw 35 (1969),
8, L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 35. For example; after marriage the husband
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law was generally adopted in the territories that later became
the United States,9 marriage converted American women of the late
eighteenth century into "legal cipher[s]."1 ° For example, the
doctrine of coverture resulted in numerous disabilities for married
women with respect to their property. At marriage the husband
could assume managerial control of the wife's real property with no
duty to account for any rent or other income. 11 A married woman
thus generally lost the power to convey her land. 12 Most "tangible
personalty" held by a woman ai marriage instantly became her husband's property, as did any personalty that later came into her
possession during the marriage. 13 Under curtesy principles, if a
child was born of the marriage, the husband received a life estate
in all of his wife's realty obtained prior to or during the marriage. 14
Beginning in 1839, all states enacted statutes that somewhat
.ameliorated the common-law limitations on a married woman's legal
rights. 15 These laws generally allowed her to manage and control
property held by her prior to the marriage. 16 The attempts at change
often met with fierce opposition, 17 and the victory for the rights of
married women was by no means absolute. Many of the statutes were
enacted in piecemeal fashion over extended periods of time and as a
result were not comprehensive.18 Furthermore, courts often strictly
took control of all the wife's personal property, he gained considerable power over
the disposition of her real property, and she lost the ability to make contracts. H.
CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 7.1, at 219-20 (1968). For a further outline
of British common-law disabilities, see P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 758-61 (P. Webb
ed. 1974); w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF, ENGLISH LAW 520-33 (3d ed. 1923).
The woman's subservient role in the marital relationship is also proclaimed in the
Old Testament, where she is viewed as a piece of property comparable to the man's
house or oxen. See Exodus 20:17.
9. See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033,
1058 (1972).
10. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1046. It is probable that even in the late
eighteenth century a married American woman had virtually no independence from
her husband. Id. at 1059. Statements on this point must be tentative because of
the dearth of reliable research. Id. at 1057-58. Marriage imposed on the husband
certain obligations such as support and dower and made him liable for the wife's
torts, but it did not directly constrain him. See L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 36-37.
11. L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 36.
12. Id. The husband could convey only his interest in the property (known as
jure uxoris), which entitled him to sole possession and control during the marriage.
Johnston, supra note 9, at 1045.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Note, The Impact of Michigan's Common-Law Disabilities of Coverture on
Married Women's Access to Credit, 14 MICH. L. REv. 76, 79 (1975).
16. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 7, at 40.
17. See Johnston, supra note 9, at 1063-67.
18, See id,
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construed the legislation to limit greatly any effects in derogation of
common-law principles. 19 Generally, however, the pre-1900 legislative .activity featured, as one court put it, "unjust rules slowly
giv[ing] way before advancing civilization."20 The gradual recognition of the property rights of the married woman is now widely
viewed as virtually complete, 21 and this development might suggest
a general acceptance of the .autonomy of each partner in the marital
relationship.
A similar process of gradual reform has given the married
woman the right to contract, 22 including the ability to obtain credit
independent of her husband, 23 and the right to retain separately
any income she earns during the marriage. 24 In other areas, however, the trend toward autonomy has not been completed. For instance, there is a long-standing custom that a woman will assume
her husband's surname after marriage. 25 Although this convention
does not affect the woman's legal or financial status, it stands as a
symbol of the wife's lack of separate identity from her husband and
might therefore be viewed as an extension of common-law coverture
policies. Despite a growing number of deviations, 26 the legal en19. See, e.g., Heacock v. Heacock, 108 Iowa 540, 541, 79 N.W. 353, 354 (1899).
20. Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299, 303 (1882). One rule that proved to be
highly resistant to change was the restriction on a married woman's power to convey
her own land. In 1913, twenty states required the involvement of the husband in
such real-property transactions, and eight states still followed the rule in 1935. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1078. Today only Alabama retains the rule. ALA. CODE
§ 30-4-12 (1977). For a relatively recent application of the statute, see Daniel v.
Haggins, 286 Ala. 409, 240 So. 2d 660 (1970).
21. See H. CLARK, supra note 8, § 7.2, at 222-23.
22. A decreasing number of jurisdictions retain common-law provisions limiting
the right of a married woman to contract or to conduct a business. In 1935 sixteen
jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii), thirteen of
which were non-community property jurisdictions, restricted the contracting ability
of married women. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1076. At the same time, eleven
states, seven of which were non-community property jurisdictions, placed restrictions
on a married woman's ability to engage in business. Id. By 1965, twelve states,
seven of which were non-community property states, still limited the ability of married women to contract. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 351 (1966). As of
1972, there were still nine states with such restrictions, Johnston, supra note 9, at 1076
n.179, despite the Supreme Court view that tlie principles supporting these constraints are "peculiar" and "obsolete." 382 U.S. at 351.
23. See Note, supra note 15, at 77.
24. It appears that by 1943 all non-community property states recognized this
right. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1070. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that married
women have no enforceable right against their husbands for the value of their labor
in domestic activities.
25. See L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 41.
26. Iowa, for example, once did not allow a married woman to retain her maiden
name, even through use of the state's name-changing process. IOWA CODE ANN. §
674.1 (West 1947). This restriction has since been removed. See IowA CoDB §
674.1 (1975).
State courts in Ohio and Maryland have held that their state common law does
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forcement of this tradition clearly retains some vitality. 27 A similar
reluctance to change traditional views of the marital relationship
characterizes the law of support28 and the legal presumption that
spouses share a common domicile. 29
Much of the rationale for the disabilities imposed on married
women is found in legal theory based on the Biblical notion that
spouses are "one flesh." 30 Marriage was seen as the union of man
not require a woman to assume her husband's name. State ex rel. Krupa v. Green,
114 Ohio App. 497, 117 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 226 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
21. See Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (1971). A
United States district court found that an Alabama requirement that a woman
"assume her husband's surname upon marriage has a rational basis and seeks to control an area where the state has a legitimate interest." Forbush v. Wallace, 341
F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971). This ruling was affirmed without opinion
by the Supreme Court. 405 U.S. 970 (1972). The Sixth Circuit relied on Forbush to affirm an unwritten Kentucky requirement that a married woman use her
husband's surname in applying for a driver's license despite a showing that for all
other purposes the woman had continued to use her maiden name. Whitlow v.
Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
28. At common law, one of the few compensations the wife received in exchange
for the legal disabilities she incurred through marriage was the guaranteed financial
support of her husband. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1046. It is still the general
rule that the primary obligation for family support rests on the husband. L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 69-70. Although some states assert a wifely duty to support
the husband under certain circumstances, see id., such as when the husband is poor
or disabled, see id. at 69 nn.219 & 220, these provisions are not meant to create
egalitarianism in the marital relationship. This legal philosophy regarding the husband's financial duty, expressed most often in alimony determinations, reflects a view
that marriage relationships are asymmetrical. So long as there is discrimination
against women in the job market and substantial numbers of traditional marriages
exist, there are practical justifications for this policy.
It should be noted that "duty to support" laws may restrict the freedom to use
interspousal contracts to redefine marriage. See Note, Marriage as Contract: Toward a Functional Redefinition of the Marital Status, 9 COLOM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
607, 619 ( 1973 ). See generally Note, supra note 6.
29. The statutes or common law of many states have perpetuated the idea that
a married woman assumed the domicile of her husband irrespective of her own
wishes. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 21, Comment a
(1971). See also Landry v. Landry, 192 So. 2d 237, 239 (La. Ct. App. 1966): "It
is too well settled to require citation of authority that a married woman can have
no other domicile than that of her husband except in those cases where the husband's
misconduct compels or justifies her in leaving him and establishing a separate domicile elsewhere."
There has recently been increased recognition that the wife may acquire a separate domicile if special circumstances make it unreasonable for husband and wife
to share the same home. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §
21, Comment d (1971). Nevertheless, courts generally follow the presumption that
a husband and wife share a common domicile, although some are reducing the standards for rebutting that presumption. For example, in Ashmore v. Ashmore, 251
So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. dismissed, 256 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1972),
the court held that, based on the dictates of "common sense," a woman could retain
her own domicile. The wife's forced acceptance of the husband's domicile has also
been modified in some states. See Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. RBv. 1169, 1177 (1974).
30. Genesis 2:22-23.
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and woman into one "person," legally recognizable as the man. 31
One curious result of this concept is the doctrine that a married
couple cannot be guilty of conspiracy between themselves because
they are legally a single entity. 32
The Supreme Court has indicated that it is dissatisfied with the
perception of a married couple as one "person." In Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 38 which involved a ban on the distribution of contraceptives,
the Court stated that a married couple "is not an independent entity
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. "M In
United States v. Dege, 35 involving a criminal conspiracy, the Court,
in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, stated that it refused "to be
obfuscated by medieval views regarding the legal status of woman
and the common law's reflection of them."86 Justice Frankfurter
found the assertion that "a wife must be presumed to act under the
coercive influence of her husband" to imply "a view of American
womanhood offensive to the ethos of our society," 37 and he asserted
that the legal submission of wife to husband no longer existed. 88
Similar recognition of the independence of spouses has also occurred
in state cases. 39 There thus seems to be a clear judicial preference
31. 1 w. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *441-43. Several variations on this theory exist. Some commentators explain that the husband is the wife's guardian, casting the male as the "protector" of his wife.- See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 406, 414 (2d ed. 1898). Others have viewed marriage as a contractual relationship in which the husband's protection and support
are tendered in return for the general services of the wife. See Johnston, supra note
9, at 1047-48. Under a male-dominance theory, some have seen married women
as properly subject to the control of their husbands. See M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 524 (1936). This theory holds that one partner
must lead-and the man is better groomed for that role. J. BENTHAM, Principles
of the Civil Code, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355-56 (J. Bowring ed. 1838).
32. W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, CRIMINAL LAW § 62, at 490 (1972). The doctrine
of interspousal-conspiracy immunity has been rejected in at least four states-California [People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 395 P.2d 893 (1964)];
Colorado [Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 37 (1920)]; 111inois [People v.
Martin, 4 Ill. 2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954)]; and Texas [Marks v. State, 144 Tex.
Crim. 509, 164 S.W.2d 690 (1942)]-and in the federal courts in United States v.
Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960). Several jurisdictions, however, still accept the doctrine.
L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 87.
33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
34. 405 U.S. at 453.
35. 364 U.S. 51 (1960).
36. 364 U.S. at 52.
37. 364 U.S. at 53.
38. 364 U.S. at 54. This development is not recent: Justice Holmes' opinion
for the Court in Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (19'14), rejected the
marital unity doctrine.
39. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1971):
So it is that the unity concept of marriage has in a large part given way
to the partner concept whereby a married woman stands as an equal to her
husband in the eyes of the law. By giving the wife a separate equal existence,
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that only minimal impairment of marital partners' autonomy should
exist.
Several current governmental policies create a special status for
marital partners. 40 The taxation structure of the Internal Revenue
Code differentiates between married and single persons. 41 This distinction presumably exemplifies Congress' view that financial interdependence is a part of marriage and warrants different treatment
by the taxation statutes. 42 Assistance programs of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare sometimes have assumed that a
family is dependent on the earning ability of the male, with the female
cast in a stereotypical "mother's" role. · Guidelines for the development of state assistance plans under Title IV of the Social Security
Act43 have in recent years expressed concern about the proper certification of "unemployed fathers" 44 and have assumed that the "mother
or caretaker relative" is to make the choices about certain types of
child care. 45 A statutory presumption that spouses are highly interdependent can also be found in the laws governing some state assistance programs. 46 Similar role stereotypes have been prevalent in
other governmental programs as well. 47
the law created a new interest in the wife which should not be left unprotected
by the courts. Medieval concepts which have no justification in our present
society should be rejected.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has rejected the "assumption that a wife
invariably acts under the compulsion of her husband, particularly in view of the advanced status of married wom1;1n." People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 881-82, 395
P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 84r (1964) (Traynor, C.J.). Chief Justice Traynor, with tongue in cheek, observed that the "fictional unity of husband and wife
has been substantially vitiated by the overwhelming evidence that one plus one adds
up to two, even in twogetherness." 61 Cal. at 880, 395 P.2d at 894, 40 Cal. Rptr.
at 846.
40. H ratified, the Equal Rights Amendment may alter many governmental policies, but many of the ramifications for marital partners are not yet known. See
generally Lexcen, supra note 6.
41. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1, 141.
42. For example, the system of joint returns allows married couples in commonlaw states to pay the same low rates already permitted for couples in community
property states, where state law reflected this concept of shared income within the
marital unit. See B. BrITKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsrATE, AND GIFI' TAXATION 346-48 (4th ed. 1972).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V 1975), especially 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(v).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(b)(5) (1975). See note 45 infra.
45. 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(b)(4)(i) (1975). However, 45 C.F.R. § 220.35 in its
entirety has been removed, effective March 16, 1976, as announced in 40 Fed. Reg.
43,182 (1975). It was superseded by 45 C.F.R. § 224 (1975). See 40 Fed. Reg.
45,819 & 47,688 (1975).
46. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(a)(l) (CUm. Supp. 1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(l)(D) (1970) conditioned a widower's receipt of Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits on proof that he received
at least one-half of his support from his spouse prior to her death. A widow, however, was not required to provide such proof. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). Noting that this scheme of benefit distribution was in part based on a
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There are, of course, limits to the usefulness of measuring society's view of a subject by reference to its laws. First, there is
nearly always a "time lag" between the point at which a societal
trend develops and the point at which the legislature responds to it.
Second, because current trends tend to regard the marital relationship as being jointly designed by largely independent marital partners, 48 it may be that the subject does not lend itself to specific
legislative action. In any event, commentators have differed on
whether the law has kept pace with the rapid evolution of the societal concept of marriage. 49 The only safe statement is that the current trend is toward greater independence of each marital partner
presumption that wives are usually dependent, the Supreme Court struck down this
regulation in Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977). The Court said that
"[t]he only conceivable justification for writing the presumption of wives' dependency into the statute" was based on assumptions that "do not suffice to justify a
gender-based discrimination in the distribution of employment-related benefits." 97
S. Ct. at 1032.
48. See Johnston, supra note 9, at 1072.
49. One contemporary source states that "[m]arriage bonds are loosening under
the strains of bro;id social and economic shifts in the nation at large-among them
the quest of women for equality in the home and 'fulfillment' in outside careers."
The American Family, supra note 1, at 30. H. CLARK, supra note 8, § 7.2, at 223,
also notes these trends, citing nonlegal materials such as B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININB
MYSTIQUE (1963); s. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953); and M. MEAD, MALE
AND FEMALE (1955).
Opinions differ on whether contemporary laws reflect this changing societal view
of marriage. A task force on family law and policy has stated that the laws of
the United States hold marriage to be a partnership in which each spouse makes
a different but equally important contribution. Report of the Task Force on Family
Law and Policy to the Citizens' Advisory Committee on the Status of Women
(1968), reprinted in WOMEN AND TIIE "EQUAL RIGHTS" AMENDMENT 408 (C. Stimpson ed. 1972). Other commentators, however, have maintained that the laws have
failed to keep pace with the status of women in society. One writer noted that
[t]he succinct comment of the 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration-''He has made
her, if married, in the eye of the law civilly dead"[-]still has weight when
applied to such matters as division of property after marriage, restrictions on
use of a woman's maiden name, choice of legal residence, etc. Such discriminatory laws have deprived women of equal status in a number of ways.
I. MURPHY, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 15 (1973) (footnote
omitted). This viewpoint was reiterated in a resolution adopted by the National
Organization of Women (NOW):
Whereas, woman's position in society rises no higher than woman's position in
the marital relationship, and
Whereas, it is within the home and family that children first learn sex-role and
identity from observation and training, and it is in the family that long-range
changes must be initiated, if there ever is to be equal partnership of men and
women in society, and
Whereas, marriages are based on unwritten contracts, many of which fail to
insure equality of the marriage partners, and
Whereas, many of the inequities we are combatting in employment, education,
etc. are based on the inequalities existent in the marriage relationship,
Therefore, be it resolved
That, NOW sets as one of its highest priorities in 1974-75 equality in the marriage relationship.
Do IT Now, October 1974, at 8.
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and greater equality in the marriage. It seems that, if this trend
should reach the status of a societal goal, the chances are good that
it will thereafter be reflected in the laws of the nation.

II.

THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Conflict of interest regulation is designed to identify and prevent
the occurrence of those situations conducive to improper decisionmaking by public officials. Such situations are commonly considered
to exist when the public official
finds it difficult if not impossible to devote himself with complete
energy, loyalty, and singleness of purpose to the general public
interest. The advantage that he seeks is something over and above
the salary, the experience, the chance to serve the people, and the
public esteem that he gains from public office. 50

A further purpose of regulation is to prevent situations from arising
that increase the appearance of likely impropriety. 51
Although it is fairly easy to define "conflict of interest" in the
abstract, identifying conflicts in specific situations is more difficult. 52
Nevertheless, there is steady political pressure at various governmental levels for increased scrutiny and regulation of possible improprieties. 53 In determining whether husband-wife employment combinations require regulation, it is necessary to analogize from existing
constraints on conflicts, since detailed attention has not been given to
the marriage partner-conflicting employment problem. In so doing
one must first identify the public interests promoted by such policies.
A.

The Doctrine of Incompatible Offices

Perhaps the most specific conflict of interest doctrine provides
50. MINN. GOVERNOR'S CoMMN. ON Ennes IN GOVERNMENT, Ennes IN GOVERNMENT 17 (1959).
51. See Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 HARV. L. RBv. 1209
(1963).
52. See 70 W. VA. L RBv. 400, 400 (1968), which states: "In describing a 'conflict of interest' one is faced with a very difficult task. Much like 'sin,' few can
define a conflict of interest, yet all are against it." Recently, executive and legislative
bodies of government have been primarily responsible for developing definitions of
conflict of interest.
53. In the early 1960s, Professor Bayless Manning saw conflict of interest considerations as a major concern of American society:
Conflicts of interest have become a modern political obsession in this country, first, because American politics is highly susceptible to morality escalation
and, second, because we are living in an era of unparallelled honesty in public
administration when we can afford the luxury of worrying about public harms
before they happen.
Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, American Government, and Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239, 248 (1964). Public concern with
morality in government and with conflicts of interest in particular has continued
unabated. See Freilich & Larson, Conflicts of Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal
for the Regulation of Municipal Transactions, 38 U.M.K.C.L REv. 373, 374 (1970).
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that it is improper for one person to hold simultaneously two public
offices deemed to be "incompatible."54 Although traditionally the
doctrine has been applied only when the two positions were held
by the same person, its underlying rationale arguably would extend
to a husband and wife holding the positions, at least if the spouses
were viewed as an entity. Under federal law, article I of the Constitution recognizes the doctrine by including the prohibition that "no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." 65 This
provision reflects four basic concerns of the framers. First, they
feared that if officials held state and federal office simultaneously
the inevitable preference for one or the other would create a threat
to federalism. 56 Second, the fundamental concept of separation of
Politicians as well as political groups and commentators have expressed concern
over conflicts of interest. President Kennedy, in an April 1961 message to Congress,
stated:
No responsibility of government is more fundamental than the responsibility
of maintaining the highest standards of ethical behavior by those who conduct
the public business. There can be no dissent from the principle that all officials
must act with unwavering integrity, absolute impartiality, and complete devotion
to the public interest.
17 CONG. Q. 918 (1961). President Carter, too, is concerned with limiting conflicts
of interest in his administration. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
Earlier, Common Cause, the public-interest lobbying group, had called for a fundamental overhaul of existing conflict of interest regulations after it had charged that
the integrity and objectivity of decisions made by many federal agencies are seriously
undermined by actual or potential conflicts of interest among agency officials and
consultants. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1976, § ,1, at 22, col. 3.
Three factors explain the heightened interest in conflict of interest problems.
First, the problem of conflicts of interest has become a political issue. Many observers once felt that conflicts of interest created "situations in which the behavioral
norms are not self-evident; campaign issues are, by contrast, normally gross and
easily understood." Note, supra note 51, at 1213. Accord, Note, Conflicts of Interest of State and Local Legislators, 55 IowA L. REv. 450, 451 (1969). In recent
years, however, conflict of interest allegations have been viewed as potent political
weapons. See Comment, Public Officials: The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Public Financial Disclosure Statutes, and a Proposal for Change, 1971 LAW
AND Soc. ORD. 104, 104-05 (1971).
Second, the press has scrutinized potentially conflicting situations with increasing
vigilance. Id. at 104. Because there is no generally accepted definition of "conflict
of interest," the press can often supply not only the relevant facts but also the standards by which the public is expected to judge a possible conflict of interest, as illustrated by the Marion Javits episode. See note 6 supra.
Third, legislatures, particularly at the state level, have been prolific in their production of conflicts of interest legislation. Especially noteworthy are the laws passed
by several states that require substantial financial disclosure by candidates and officeholders. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A-101 to -107 (Smith-Hurd 1975); CAL.
GOVT. CODE§§ 87200-87202 (West 1975).
54. There is little doubt that the incompatible-office doctrine is a form of conflict
of interest regulation. See Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees, 47 VA. L. REv. 1034, 1075 (1961). For example, United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 453 n.28 (1965), refers to incompatible office provisions as being
conflict of interest laws.
55. U.S. CoNST., art. I,§ 6, cl. 2.
56. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THB UNITED STATES
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powers would be endangered if a person could hold positions in more
than one branch of government. 57 Third, there was concern _that
legislators holding other positions might not act in the general public
interest. 58 Finally, the provision manifests a view that corruption
could result from allowing one person to hold too much power. 59
These general principles survive, but, even though the paucity
of cases under the incompatibility clause makes generalization difficult, today most emphasis is probably placed upon the concerns involving corruption and separation of powers. In Reservists Committee To Stop the War v. Laird, 60 a federal district court concluded
that the incompatibility clause prevented members of Congress from
holding commissions in the armed forces reserves during their terms
of office. 61 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the alleged violation, and
it therefore did not reach the merits. Justice Douglas, in dissent,
stated that concerns about corruption are the foundation of the
clause which in his view provided a "specific bulwark against .
potential abuses." 62
, Many states also have constitutional provisions proscribing incompatible offices for legislators. These prohibitions generally
cover offices within the state government, 63 offices in other state
635 (5th ed. 1891). Story maintained that the incompatibility clause reflects a fear
that the federal government would receive preferential treatment. Id. But see Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1033 (1974), which suggests that the framers were concerned
about parochialism.
57. James Madison asserted that the incompatibility clause established a crucial
guard against "the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body." THE
FEDERALIST No. 76, at 476 (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
58. See J. SI-ORY, supra note 56, at 635.
59. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CoNSTITUTION 618 (1947); Watson, supra
note 56, at 1038.
60. 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), affd. mem. 495 F.2d 1075 (1972), revd.
on other grounds sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974).
61. "[f]he interest in maintaining independence among the branches of government is shared by all citizens equally, and • . • this is the primary if not the sole
purpose of the bar against Congressmen holding executive office." 323 F. Supp.
at 841. On the Court's concern with incompatible offices, see Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). Cf. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933)
(stressing the importance of separation of powers, especially an independent judiciary).
62. 418 U.S. at 232 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104 (1968)).
63. A relatively recent report indicates that 37 states have constitutional provisions stating that persons may not be seated in the state legislature if they hold
certain other positions in the state government. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARCH
FuND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEX DIGESf OF STATE CoNsrITUTIONS, 662-63
(2d ed. 1959 & Supp. 1971) (hereinafter cited as INDEX). See, e.g., ILL. CoNST.
art. IV, § 3; TEX. CoNsr. art. III, § 19.
The constitutions of 24 states bar the appointment of a member of the legislature

1658

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1647

governments, 64 and offices in the federal government. oti Although
it is often difficult to ascertain the purpose of these provisions,
they probably were motivated by concerns similar to those that led
to the adoption of the Constitution's incompatible-office clause. 00
The common law also prevented a person from holding incompatible offices. 67 Although the courts have established no clear
rules on what constitutes an incompatible office, 68 a variety of tests
to other offices created by or given salary increases by the legislature. INDEX, supra,
at 663-64. See, e.g., N.D. CoNST. art. II, § 39.
64. Twelve state constitutions generally prohibit legislators from holding positions
in the government of another state. INDEX, supra note 63, at 666. See, e.g., TEX,
CoNST. art. XVI, § 12; S.C. CoNST. art. III, § 24.
65. The constitutions of 42 states forbid their legislators from holding federal
appointments. INDEX, supra note 63, at 665. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. II, § 5;
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
66. For example, in commenting on the convention that drafted the separation
of powers provisions in the Virginia constitution, Thomas Jefferson stated: "[T]hat
convention . . . laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments should be separate and distinct so that no person should exercise
the powers of more than one of them at the same time." T. JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 1781-1785, ch. 13, reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 649 (1943). Note, however, Baker v. Hazen, 133 Vt. 433, 437,
341 A.2d 707, 710 (1975), where the court stated that it was forced to construe
the state constitutional provision on incompatible offices "[w]ith an uncertainty of
the measure of the mischief sought to be prevented."
Jefferson's incompatible-duties doctrine has been followed in many cases. Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 1, 211 Ore. 360, 369, 315 P.2d 797, 804 (1957), construed state constitutional provisions that focused, as Jefferson did, on separation
of duties, as proscribing a public school teacher from simultaneously serving as a
state legislator, since he was charged with ''functions of another department of government."
With almost equal frequency, state courts view incompatible-office restraints as
intended to prevent the accumulation of too much power in the hands of a single
person. In McCutcheon v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 443, 447, 216 N.W.2d 137,
139 (1974), the Minnesota court expressed concern about individuals put in the
position of being able to make policy decisions not subject to supervision. Similarly,
in State ex rel. Harris v. Watson, 201 N.C. 661, 663, 161 S.E. 215, 216 (1931),
the North Carolina court interpreted the state constitution's incompatible-office provision as intended to prevent the accumulation by a single person of offices of public
trust.
Some courts have viewed potential for corruption as another concern underlying
incompatibility clauses. For example, the Arizona court in State ex rel. Pickrell v.
Myers, 89 Ariz. 167, 169, 359 P.2d 757, 759 (1961), held that the Arizona constitution's incompatibility clause is intended to prevent legislative control over an office
that a legislator might hold.
67. Note, supra note 54, at 1071. See Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 446,
96 A. 769, 770 (1916).
68. This situation is best explained in Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 265, 148 A.
434, 436 (1930):
The courts, because of the difficulty in laying down any clear and comprehensive rule as to what -constitutes incompatibility of offices, have evaded the formulation of any definition, and as a rule have contented themselves with the discussion of the facts of the case under consideration, in connection with similar
and analogous facts in other cases . . . •
See also Knuckles v. Board of Educ., 272 Ky. 431, 435, 114 S.W.2d 511, 514 (1938),
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have been suggested. Some courts apply the doctrine of incompatibility if one position is subordinate to the other. 69 Others consider
whether one office holds the power of appointment to the other70
or whether one position is responsible for auditing the accounts of
the other. 71 Increasingly, however, courts are applying a more general conflict of interest standard by determining whether the functions
of the offices are inherently inconsistent and repugnant. 72 Regardless of the test used, the underlying concerns are generally the
same: 73 the interest in deterring corruption, 74 the interest in the undivided loyalty of the officeholder, 75 and the interest in maintaining
public confidence in the legitimacy of government. 76
69. See Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 266, 148 A. 434, 436 (1930); State ex rel.
Hover. v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 116-18, 191 N.E.2d 723, 725-26 (1963); State
ex rel. Metcalf v. Goff, 15 R.I. 505, 507, 9 A. 226,227 (1887).
·
10. See Knuckles v. Board of Educ., 272 Ky. 431, 435-36, 114 S.W.2d 511, 514
(1938) (dictum).
11. See People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 642, 107 P.2d 388,
392 (1940) (dictum).
72. See People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 641-42, 107 P.2d
388, 391-92 (1940). But see Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360 (1960),
where the court attempted to distinguish conflicts of interest from conflicts of duties.
In Reilly, the court maintained that conflicts of duty occur when incompatibility inheres "in the very relationship of one office to the other and is contemplated by
the scheme of governmental activities, albeit the occasions may be rare." 33 N.J.
at 549, 166 A.2d at 370. Conflicts of interest, however, arise from specific circumstances. In short, conflicts of interest are thought to require case-by-case consideration, while conflicts of duty arise from the nature of the offices themselves regardless
of the particular situation. 33 N.J. at 549-50, 166 A.2d at 370. This distinction
may, however, be academic. See Note, supra note 54, at 1075.
73. The common law seemed only minimally concerned with separation of powers.
In Poynter v. Walling, 54 Del. 409, 415, 177 A.2d 641, 645 (1962), the court took
notice of the fact that the doctrine of separation of powers had not been "adhered to
with theoretical rigor." Noting constitutional changes in several states, the court said
that " '[t]he inference may be drawn that partial relaxation of the doctrine of separa. tion of powers is not repugnant to the will of the people."' 54 Del. at 415, 177 A.2d
at 645 (quoting In re Opinion of the Justices, 47 Del. (8 Terry) 117, 136, 88 A.2d
128, 138 (1952)). See also Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93,369 P.2d 590 (1962),
where the court maintained that a state constitutional provision required only that
"the basic powers of the sovereignty • . . must remain separate, [and] not subsidiary
activities" such as the ascertainment of fact, investigation, and consultation. 84
Idaho at 100, 369 P.2d at 594. This position should be contrasted with the federal
constitutional concerns about separation of powers evidenced by the incompatibleoffice clause. See note 57 and accompanying text and note 61 supra.
74. See Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 266, 148 A. 434, 436 (1930), where the
court supported a presumption under the incompatible offices doctrine that a dual
officeholder might be incapable of executing both responsibilities honestly. In State
ex rel. Hover v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 116, 191 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1963), the
court referred to the danger of one office being used to accomplish purposes and
duties not otherwise possible for the other office.
15. See Jones v. McDonald, 33 NJ. 132, 135, 162 A.2d 817, 818 (1960).
16. See Housing Auth. of New Haven v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247, 251, 320 A.2d
820, 822 (1973). Cf. People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 186, 524 P.2d 363, 367,
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In summary, the incompatible office doctrine identifies and
protects at least five societal interests. First, it seeks to guard the
separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government. Second, it aims to prevent a concentration of undue power
in one public official. Third, it is designed to discourage corruption.
Fourth, it attempts to foster the undivided loyalty of officeholders
to the public interest. Finally, it hopes to maintain public confidence in the integrity of government.
B.

Regulation by Statutes and Codes of Ethics

Federal statutes and codes of ethics, like the incompatible office
doctrine, seek to restrain possible conflicts of interest. Congress enacted legislation in 196277 designed to strengthen and consolidate
the existing conflicts regulation. 78 These statutes are important to
the present inquiry not so much for their substantive content as for
the aid they give in identifying the general interest protected by
typical conflicts legislation. The two statutes directly applicable to
members of Congress79 merely prohibit them from representing
private parties in agency matters in which the United States is a party
or has a substantial interest80 and from practicing as attorneys in the
Court of Claims. 81 The legislative history of predecessor statutes
of the section involving agency matters demonstrates congressional
concern about possible corruption and about the exercise of undue
influence in public decisionmaking, 82 and, according to one source,
115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239 (1974) (risk to public confidence in criminal justice system
when city attorney acts as defense attorney).
77. 18 u.s.c. §§ 201-218 (1970).
78. S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CoDB
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3852-53.
19. See Krasnow & Lankford, Congressional Conflicts of Interest: Who Watches
the Watchers?, 24 FED. B.J. 264,272 (1964).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1970).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 204 (1970). Neither the legislative history nor subsequent judicial interpretation clearly indicates what interests are to be protected by § 204, In
perhaps the most helpful statement on the subject, the Supreme Court found the purpose of a predecessor statute to be "to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service,"
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372 (1882),
82. The general provisions of the current § 203 originated in a statute approved
in 1864. 13 Stat. 123 (1864), noted in Manning, supra note 53, at 239 n.8. 18
U.S.C. § 281 (1958) left this section essentially unchanged.
In Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 368 (1906), the Supreme Court cited
corruption and undue influence as the dangers sought to be avoided by enactment
of the predecessor to § 203:
I.T]he statute has for its main object to secure the integrity of executive
action against undue influence upon the,part of members of that branch of the
Government whose favor may have much to do with the appointment to, or
retention in, public position of those whose official action it is sought to control
or direct.

August 1977]

Marriage and Conflicts of Interest

1661

the provision "is broadly worded in order to cover all the multifarious
forms of influence peddling whereby a member of Congress accepts
compensation for acts and decisions made in his official capacity." 83
In commenting generally on the 1962 legislation,84 the House Judiciary Committee provided an excellent summary of the interests it
intended to protect:
The proper operation of a democratic government requires that
officials be independent and impartial; that Government decisions
and policy be- made in the proper channels of the governmental
structure; that public office not be used for personal gain; and
that the public have confidence in the integrity of its government.
The attainment of one or more of these ends is impaired whenever
there exists, or appears to exist, an actual or potential conflict between the private interests of a Government employee and his
duties as an official. The public interest therefore, requires that
the law protect against such conflicts of interest and establish appropriate ethical standards with respect to employee conduct in situations where actual or potential conflicts exist. 85
Congressional interest in neutrality in decisionmaking and in freedom from corruption is also indicated by the House rule prohibiting
members of Congress from voting on matters in which they have
private interests. 86
The various codes of ethics that Congress has adopted over the
years provide further examples of that body's attitude on conflicts
The Court goes ori to note that the attending evils are increased when financial reward is involved. 202 U.S. at 368.
In United States v. Reisley, 35 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.J. 1940), the district court asserted that prevention of corruption was the major concern of the same statute. The
court, in referring to several conflict of interest statutes, stated: "Congress has enacted
numerous statutes with the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the public administration and has made penal many actions by public officers which would result
in corruption in government." 35 F. Supp. at 104. In United States v. Anderson,
509 F.2d 312, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court construed new § 203 as embodying
these same concerns.
83. Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 272.
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1970) also includes several provisions that, though
not directly applicable to members of Congress, have at least some relevance to the
topic under discussion: 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) (activities of officers and employees
in claims against and other matters affecting government); 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970)
(disqualification of former officers and employees in matters connected with former
duties or official responsibilities; disqualification of partners of executive branch employees); 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1970) (salary of government officials and employees
payable only by the United States).
·
85. H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1961). A similar report from
the Senate Judiciary Committee, less specific in pinpointing the interests to be protected, mentioned preventing "unethical conduct," S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962), reprinted in [1962] 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & An. NEWS 3852, 3853, and
preserving "integrity." Id. at 3856. At least one other statute regulates conflicts
of interest involving members of Congress. 46 U.S.C. § 1223(e) (1970) makes it
unlawful for a contractor or charterer operating under the Merchant Marine Act
to employ a member of Congress as "an attorney, agent, officer, or director."
86. "Every Member • . • shall vote on each question put, unless he has a direct
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of interest. The first code, 87 passed in 1959 after Congress had felt
considerable pressure to provide guidelines, 88 is applicable to all
federal employees. 89 Its rather general provisions reveal the desire
to prevent corruption, 90 to retain undivided loyalty to the public interest, 91 and to maintain public confidence in government. 92
In 1968, the Senate and House passed resolutions that established separate, stringent ethics codes for each chamber and required
financial disclosure by members of Congress. 93 The codes of both
houses stressed the need to prevent corruption and to maintain
loyalty to the public interest. 94 These same themes are evidenced
in numerous 1977 amendments that create more stringent ethics
personal or pecuniary interest in the event of such a question." JEFFERSON'S MANUAL
AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 459, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 318 (1961). Administration of this provision is left largely to the discretion
of the individual member. Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 276.
The prohibition is traced to Thomas Jefferson's manual on parliamentary practice,
which states:
Where the private interests of a member are concerned in a bill or question,
he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his voice has
been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary, not only to the
laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the social compact, which
denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, it is for the honor of the
House that this rule, of immemorial observance, should be strictly adhered to,
U.S. CONGRESS, CoNSTITUTlON OF THE UNITED STATES (CoNSTITUTIONAL MANUAL
RULES) 78 (1860-1861).
87. H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 1312 (1958).
88. See Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situations and Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L.
REV. 666, 697 (1959).
89. The code's legislative history indicates that the code applies to members of
Congress. S. REP. No. 1812, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
90. This interest is most visible in the prohibition on taking "favors or benefits
under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing
the performance of . . . governmental duties." Further, government employees are
commanded to "[e]xpose corruption wherever discovered" and to "[n]ever use any
information coming . . . confidentially in the performance of governmental duties
as a means for making private profit." H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
72 Stat. 1312 (1958).
91. H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 1312 (1958), manifested
concern about the "dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone" and engaging
in business with the Government "inconsistent with the conscientious performance
of . . . governmental duties."
92. The code contains a general admonition to "(u]phold these principles, ever
conscious that public office is a public trust." H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong,,
2d Sess., 72 Stat. 1312 (1958).
93. S. Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 7406 (1968), and H. Res.
1099, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 8776 (1968).
94. H. Res. 1099, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(a), 114 CoNG. REc. 8776 (1968);
see S. Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2, 114 CONG, REC. 7406 (1968). The Senate
resolution specifically proclaims that a public official "must never conduct his own
affairs so as to infringe on the public interest." S. Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 1 (1968).
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codes and require more complete financial disclosure. 95 Both houses
of Congress now require that members report personal financial
information, which is subsequently disclosed to the public, 96 indicating congressional concern for the interest in maintaining public
confidence in the integrity of the government.
The many interests identified thus far as meriting protection in
conflicts of interest regulation may be refined into three broad societal norms. First, the regulation should assure that the government
functions in a manner representative of the people it is designed to
serve. This category thus includes the public interest in promoting
undivided loyalty of officeholders to the public interest97 and in preventing officials from using their positions for personal gain or for
similar private purposes. 98 Second, the citizenry should have faith
in the efficient and ethical operation of its government. 99 In order
to promote a high level of public confidence, conflict of interest provisions regulate situations in which the appearance of governmental
impropriety is present. Third, the conflicts of interest regulation
95. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (approved April 1, 1977); H. Res. 287,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (approved March 2, 1977).
96. See S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977); H. Res. 2·87, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § lOl(a) (1977).
97. Commentators have generally cited "undivided loyalty" as a concern underlying conflict of interest regulation. As phrased by one author, "[a]n officer whose
private interests would prevent him from exercising impartial judgment in matters
of public concern should not be allowed to serve." 70 W. VA. L. REV. 400, 400
(1968). Kaufman and Widiss noted that the California conflict of interest statutes
sought "to insure that public officers in the discharge of their responsibilities are absolutely free from any influence other than that which flows directly out of their obligations to the public at large." Kaufman & Widiss, The California Conflict of
Interest Laws, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 186, 186-87 (1963). Some of these "undivided
loyalty" concepts are drawn from common-law theories that viewed public officials as
trustees who were not to be pecuniarily involved in the affairs or interests of the
beneficiary because of the danger that the trustee would "act to enhance his own
interests rather than those of his cestui que trust." Note, Conflict-of-Interests of
Government Personnel: An Appraisal of the Philadelphia Situation, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 985 (1959). The cestui que trust may be identified as the government, id., or
the public, Note, supra note 54, at 1034. This fiduciary principle has been invoked
where no specific statute covered a potential conflict of interest situation. See United
States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910).
98. One author noted that "[h]onesty of government officials, whether elected
or appointed, is essential to the American political system." Comment, supra note
53, at 104. Another commentator expressed the concern that "public officials should
not have a personal interest in the business transactions in which they are engaged
for government, nor should they exploit their influence or acquaintances with persons
who conduct their transactions so that businesses in which they have a personal interest are profited." Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 686. See also Note, supra note 53,
at 450; Note, supra note 54, at 1045.
99. Many commentaries indicate that conflict of interest provisions generally
serve to protect the image of government, commonly referring to the need to maintain "public confidence" in the integrity of public officials. See, e.g., Comment, Legislative Conflicts of Interest-An Analysis of the Pennsylvania Legislative Code of
Ethics, 19 VILL. L. REv. 82 ( 1973); Note, supra note 53, at 450.
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should help ensure that certain processes are followed in governmental
decisionmaking-those that transform public desire into public policy
through compliance with the policymaking designs established in
the Constitution and subsequent .legislation. This societal notion is
particularly concerned with preventing the accumulation of power
in the hands of one person, with preserving the separation of powers
among the three branches of government, and with promoting
economy and efficiency in government. 100 Any effective conflict
of interest legislation must be consistent with these three norms.
III.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE MARRIAGE CONTEXT

The 1977 revisions of the codes of conduct in both houses
provide the one direct example of members of Congress considering
potential conflicts of interest in both their activities and the activities
of their spouses. 101 Members of the House are now required to report information regarding income, 102 gifts, 103 reimbursements, 10 '
property,105 securities, 106 and liabilities. 107 Information on these
Others stress the related, but perhaps more superficial, concern with the appearance of impropriety. See Note, supra note 51, at 1209. Freilich and Larson asserted
that "we would contend . . • that a concern for 'appearances' is not ill-founded. The
public is entitled to the services of men who are intelligent enough to know at least
what appears to be improper. It is bad enough to appear incompetent; there is no
reason to appear dishonest." Freilich & Larson, supra note 53, at 376.
100. Concerns about accumulation of power and separation of powers are seldom
mentioned as interests protected by conflict of interest legislation not dealing witb
incompatibility. When separation of powers is mentioned, it is usually in the context
of the need for the branches of government to police themselves, in order to avoid
infringement on powers by imposing conflict guidelines on each other. See Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 696.
The promotion of governmental efficiency is in large part a corollary to the concern about preventing corruption, since a "corrupt government is an inefficient government." SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FEDERAL CoNFLICT OF INTEREST LAws, THE AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CnY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
FEDERAL SERVICE 6 (1960).
101. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
102. Members must report the source and amount of all "[i]tems of income (including honorariums) from a single source aggregating $100 or more." H. Res. 287,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l0l(a) (1977).
103. With certain exceptions, reports must be made of gifts from a single source
aggregating $100 or more in value. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (a)
(1977). The most significant exception is that only gifts of "transportation, lodging,
food or entertainment from a single source (other than from a relative of [a member]
reporting) aggregating $250 or more in value" need be reported. H. Res. 287, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) (1977).
104. Direct or indirect reimbursements from a single source for expenditures aggregating $250 or more must be disclosed. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101
(a) (1977).
105. Reports must be made of "any property held, directly or indirectly, in a
trade or business or for investment or the production of income and which has a
fair market value of at least $1,000." H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l0l(a)
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matters also must be supplied for "the spouse of the [member]
reporting [if such] information relates to items under constructive
control of' the member. 108 However, the constraints placed on
House members regarding the acceptance of gifts109 and the accruing
of outside earned income110 appear to have no direct impact on a
member's spouse.
The Senate's new financial disclosure regulations are quite
similar to those of the House: indeed, the requirements for reporting income, gifts, property, securities, and liabilities are virtually
identical. 111 The Senate rules, however, require less complete disclosure for interests of a member's spouse. 112 Another new Senate
rule explicitly prohibits a member's spouse from accepting gifts with
annual aggregate value over $100 if the donor has a direct interest
in legislation before Congress. 113 But, like the House rules, the
Senate regulations on outside earned income place no specific constraints on the income of a member's spouse.
One new Senate provision does address conflicts of interest arising from the employment of a member's spouse. It states that
[n]o Member . . . shall knowingly use his official position to intro(1977). With some exceptions, there also must be disclosure of "any purchase or
sale, directly or indirectly, of any interest in real property" with value in excess of
$1,000. H. Res. 287, 95thCong., lstSess. § lOl(a) (1977).
106. Listing must be made of most transactions of securities and commodities
futures in excess of $1,000. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) (11-977).
107. Identification of most liabilities exceeding $2,500 must be made. H. Res.
287, 95th Cong., lstSess. § lOl(a) (1977).
108. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) (1977).
109. "A Member . . . shall not accept gifts (other than personal hospitality of
an individual or with a fair market value of $35 or less) in any calendar year aggregating $100 or more in value, directly or indirectly, from any person (other than
from a relative of his) having a direct interest in legislation before the Congress
or who is a foreign national (or agent of a foreign national)." H. Res. 287, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1977).
110. Members of the House may not have annual outside earned income "in excess of 15 per centum of the aggregate salary as a Member paid to the Member."
Id. § 601. Several sources, such as certain pension plans, profit-sharing programs,
and family businesses, are not viewed as producing outside income. Income attributable to a member's spouse is apparently excluded from the outside income category
by the notation that "[o]utside earned income shall be determined without regard
to any community property law." H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a)
(1977).
111. See S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977).
112. The minimum amounts above which earned income and gifts must be reported are lower for members' interests than for those of their spouses. A Senator
is required to report holdings or sale of real property, holdings of personal property,
and the transaction of securities or commodities futures only if these interests were
in the "constructive control" of the Senator. One is stated to be in "constructive
control" if "the enhancement of the interest would substantially benefit the reporting
individual." S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977).
113. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977).
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duce or aid the progress or passage of legislation, a principal purpose of which is to further only his pecuniary interest, only the
pecuniary interest of his immediate family, or only the pecuniary
interest of a limited class of persons or enterprises, when he, or his
immediate family, or enterprises controlled by them are members
of the affected class. 114
It is apparent that only rather egregious conflicts of interest are controlled by this section. More subtle conflicts, such as those contemplated by this Note, 115 go unregulated.
In dealing with conflicts of interest, Congress has indicated that
it sees substantial financial and legal interdependence between
members and their spouses. This view is expressed by the rule in
both houses that requires extensive disclosure of the financial condition of each member's spouse. The ethics codes of both houses,
however, do little to restrict the employment or financial activities
of members' spouses. Thus, the ethics regulations of each house
indicate that, when faced with the competing interests of the public's
demand for stricter conflict of interest regulation and society's increasing recognition of autonomy for marital partners, Congress has
chosen to give weight to the conflict of interest considerations.
However, the failure of Congress to put major restraints other than
financial disclosure on members' spouses might be viewed as at
least some compromise between these competing interests.U 0
Several conflicts of interest problems that occur outside the congressional area may provide useful analogies. Conflicts that arise
because both spouses are practicing attorneys are occurring more
frequently, "for it is a fact of modern society that women are
entering the profession in increasing numbers and that increasing
numbers of these women are married to lawyers." 117 In a formal
opinion concerning a hypothetical situation in which both husband
and wife were lawyers who did not practice in the same firm, an
American Bar Association committee found no impropriety where
one spouse represented a party adverse to one represented by the
other spouse's firm so long as full disclosure of the potential conflicts
in this employment arrangement was made to the client.118 This
114. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977).
115. See text at notes 132-34 infra.
116. Irrespective of possible congressional intent to strike a compromise, the financial disclosure regulations may have the indirect effect of greatly restricting the
employment activity of a member's spouse. See note 183 infra.
117. ABA STANDING CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL -ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 340, at
2 (1975).
118. The committee believed that a husband-wife team was "not necessarily prohibited from representing different interests or from being associated with firms representing different interests." Id. at 1. It stated that "the situation should be fully
explained to the client and the question of acceptance left to the client for decision,"
Id.
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result demonstrates a compromise between the emerging concept of
spousal independence and the prevention of conflicts of interest.
The committee viewed the marriage partners as sufficiently independent to exercise professional judgment unaffected by the other's
opinion, and therefore it rejected a complete prohibition of spousal
representation of conflicting interests. Recognizing, however, that
the closeness of the marital relationship might lead to inadvertent
improper conduct, 119 the committee did not consider the spouses as
entirely independent practitioners, and therefore it required disclosure to the client.120
Employees in the executive branch are also bound by conflicts
of interest provisions that regulate spouses. Federal employees are,
for instance, generally prohibited from holding personal financial interests in governmental matters in which they are substantially
involved, 121 and the prohibition specifically includes interests of the
employee's spouse. 122 This approach indicates a perception of an
interrelationship in marriage that could preclude independent judgment by the employee. 123 Similarly, Executive Order 11,222,124
119. The committee stated:
[I]t also must be recognized that the relationship of husband and wife is so
close that the possibility of an inadvertent breach of a confidence or the unavoidable receipt of information concerning the client by the spouse other than
the one who represents the client (for example, information contained in a telephone message left for the lawyer at home) is substantial.
Id.
120. Within the past several years, regulatory groups in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, and Virginia have produced opinions limiting husband-wife attorney activity.
Note, Legal Ethics-Representation of Differing Interests by Husband and Wife:
Appearances of Impropriety and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest?, 52 DEN. L.J.
735, 735-36 (1975). These rulings-if still meaningful after the later ABA opinion
discussed in the text-would severely restrict the ability of husband-wife attorney
teams to seek jobs in the same geographic area. Id. at 737.
121. 18 u.s.c. § 208 (1970).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1970).
123. These provisions are less stringent than they might seem at first glance.
If the employee fully discloses a potential conflict and the government official who
was responsible for his appointment renders a written determination "that the interest
is not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services"
of the employee, the prohibitions of the statute will not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)
(1970).
The regulations of the Civil Service Commission express few concerns about potential "incompatible office" problems arising out of the hiring of agency employees.
The only specific limitation is that not more than two persons from the same immediate family can be employed in the competitive branch of the civil service program.
18 U.S.C. § 3319(a) (1970). Under the regulations, both husband and wife may
be employed in the civil service provided no regulations of the individual agency
are violated. The Commission's regulations are primarily concerned with problems
of nepotism or favored employment status for members of one family, since few
civil service positions involve the sort of policymaking to which issues of judgmental
independence are relevant.
124. 3 C.F.R. 306 (1965).
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which is directed at federal agencies and departments, requires that
the financial interests of a spouse or other family member125 be considered part of the interests of the employee. 126
Finally, a few state courts also have considered the issue, usually
when participation by a public official in a decision is challenged because a spouse or other relative of the official allegedly had an interest in the result. Courts have generally held that the interest of a
relative is not a disqualifying factor. 127 If the relationship is marital,
however, the courts have been more likely to disqualify the official.128 Those courts finding no direct conflict of interest when both
husband ·and wife are somehow involved in a decision tend to rest
their opinions on the ability of both to make contracts and to retain
their own earnings. 129 Cases finding an improper interest under
these circumstances are based on the belief that each spouse inevitably benefits from the other's individual income and financial transactions. For example, in Githens v. Butler County, 180 the Supreme
125. The interests of any other member of the employee's immediate household
also are considered to be an interest of the employee. See id.
Individual departmental and agency regulations have emulated these provisions,
See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 10.735-405(c) (1977) (Department of State). More extensive
reporting of a spouse's holdings and business affairs is required under 28 C.F.R.
§ 45.735-22 (1975) (Department of Justice).
126. President Carter's proposal for a new executive order on this subject apparently would continue to require disclosure of personal finances by both governmental
employees and their spouses. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1977, § A, at 17, col. 1.
Intra-family gifts, on the other hand, are excepted from the restrictions on the
receipt of gifts or favors by federal employees. Exceptions are made where "obvious
family or personal relationships rather than the business of the person concerned
. . . are the motivating factors-the clearest illustration being the parents, children
or spouses of federal employees." Executive Order 11,222, § 201(b), 3 C.F.R. 156
(1974). Similar exceptions are made in individual departmental and agency regulations. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 0.735-ll(b)(l) (1976) (Federal Trade Commission);
24 C.F.R. § 0.735-203(b)(l) (1977) (Department of Housing and Urban Development). The regulations of the Department of Agriculture define this exception to
the gifts and favors rule as employee acceptance of "courtesies in an obvious family
or personal relationship" when it is clear that the relationship is the "motivating
factor." 7 C.F.R. § 0.735-12(b)'(l) (1976).
127. Annot., 74 A.L.R. 790, 792 (1931). The rule has been generally followed
in more recent cases.
128. Arkansas, Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio decisions indicate no conflict, see
note 129 infra; Idaho, Missouri, and West Virginia cases take the opposite position.
See notes 130-31 infra and accompanying text. Because of their age, some of these
cases are of questionable validity.
129. See Thompson v. School Dist. No. 1, 252 Mich. 629, 630-31, 233 N.W.
439, 439-40 (1930). Other cases finding no improper interest are based on determinations that the accused spouse received no pecuniary benefit. See Brewer v. Howell,
299 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Ark. 1957); Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 40809, 206 A.2d 678, 683 (1964). In Board of Educ. v. Boal, 104 Ohio St. 482, 48S86, 135 N.E. 540, 541 (1922), the Ohio court made an unusual statutory interpretation that would allow public officials to be involved in making a public contract
with their spouses but not with their fathers, mothers, brothers, or sisters.
130. 350 Mo. 295, 299, 165 S.W.2d 650 (1942).
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Court of Missouri noted that, "[t]hough the husband may have no
present interest in his wife's separate estate[,] there can be no question but that because of the relationship he does have such a beneficial interest in her property and affairs as to be 'indirectly' interested in any contract to which she is a party.msi
In summary, to date the governmental policies developed on
conflict of interest arising out of marriage have tended to treat
spouses both as individuals and as persons whose interdependence
might impair their personal judgment. To avoid overbroad regulations, however, and perhaps to avoid undue impairment of employment possibilities for each spouse, disclosure has been the primary
means of setting standards for conflicts situations. Whether this
scheme is a necessary or adequate safeguard for Congress remains
to be considered.
IV.

NECESSITY OF CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION

In designing legislation or other regulatory devices to control
conflicts of interest arising out of the relationship between members
of Congress and their spouses, the basic policy question is whether
marriage can affect the decisions of a member of Congress in ways
contrary to the public interest. In analyzing this question, personal
relationships should be viewed as a continuum. At one extreme of
the continuum, people are mere acquaintances with no strong personal
ties. At the other extreme are those relationships in which two persons are bound together by close kinship combined with strong legal,
financial, and emotional connections, all of which result in a near
identity of interests. In between, of course, fall myriad relationships
of varying degrees of intimacy--close relatives, close personal
friends, individual members of common interest groups, and the like.
In determining the need for regulation in any of these situations, one
must examine the extent to which the relationship endangers the basic
norms previously identified as protected by conflicts of interest regulation: protection of popular representation, protection of public
131. 350 Mo. at 299, 165 S.W.2d at 652. See also Clark :v. Utah Constr.
Co., 51 Idaho 587, 8 P.2d 454 (1932); Nuckols v. Lyle, 8 Idaho 589, 70 P. 401
(1902). At least one court found an indirect interest of the husband even in the
face of the married women's property acts:
Giving to the various statutes guaranteeing to married women control of their
separate estates, and free from the control of the husband, and with recognition
of the many legal refinements which may be drawn therefrom, we are still of
the opinion that either a husband or wife, living together as such, has pecuniary
interest in a contract of employment of the other . . . . [T]here is still a relation existing between husband and wife, and mutual liabilities growing out of
the family relation, which creates, on the part of each, an interest in the contracts of the other, out of which compensation arises, and the proceeds of which
are used directly or indirectly in the family circle.
Haislip v. White, 22 S.E.2d 361, 365-66 (W. Va. 1942).
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confidence in government, and protection of proper decisionmaking
processes. And affecting the level of danger to these norms are
three aspects of personal relationships-the financial, the domiciliary, and the emotional.
Close financial ties particularly endanger the representative
nature of government. A person with financial responsibility to
another might be tempted to deviate from undivided loyalty to the
public interest in order to avoid monetary harm to, or create tangible
benefits for, the other person. Furthermore, regardless of whether
it creates an actual constraint on independent judgment, a financial
interrelationship creates a public impression of divided loyalty that
can decrease confidence in government. Also, a financial interrelationship between a member of Congress and an employee of either
the public or private sector could generate doubts about the validity
of governmental decisionmaking. The simplest example of this
problem is where the financial ties between a member of Congress
and an employee in the executive branch threaten the separation of
powers and the accompanying checks and balances deemed important by society. This particular combination of interests also tends
to result in the accumulation of more power than would be available
to the individual acting alone. The separation of powers problem
does not apply if the second party is employed in the private sector,
but major concern would still exist over improper influence on governmental decisionmaking.
The second aspect of personal relationships that may raise a
conflict of interest problem is the sharing of a domicile. 132 A
public servant might have considerable difficulty maintaining impartiality in matters involving a person with whom he lives. Such
an interrelationship may also impair public confidence in government because its visibility enhances the inference of impropriety.
Perhaps most important, a shared domicile may infringe upon the
societal interest in the validity of governmental decisionmaking.
Presumably, persons sharing a household communicate on a full
range of subjects, and this exchange of information may inadvertently or intentionally include confidential matters. This communication could be a source of corruption if one person is a member of
Congress and the other works in the private sector, or it could endanger the separation of powers if the second person works in a different branch of the government.188
132. Similar concerns might arise about people who share an office or who habitually work in close proximity to each other.
133. The domiciliary relationship has been subject to prior regulation in the conflict of interest area. The financial disclosure requirements in Executive Order
11,222 § 403(a), 3 C.F.R. 306 (1965), state that "[t]he interest of a spouse, minor
child, or other member of his immediate household shall be considered to be an
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Finally, an emotional relationship between a member of
Congress and an employee in the public or private sector may constrain the former's ability to have undivided loyalty to the public good
when the interests of the other person are inconsistent with those
of the public. i-s¼ This arrangement potentially compromises the
"representative" role of a public official and will give the appearance
of impropriety should the relationship become generally known. As
with financial interrelationships, the existence of emotional ties between such individuals might create a joinder of interests sufficient to raise doubts about the validity of the governmental
decisionmaking in which one or both are involved due either to infringement of the separation of powers or to the undue concentration
of power.
In applying to marriage the three aspects of personal relationships identified .above, the inquiry is not necessarily narrowed. Not
every married couple maintains a substantial financial interrelationship;135 spouses do not always share a domicile;186 and, within its
legal definition, marriage does not require .an emotional attachment
of partners.137 It does appear, however, that the large majority of
American marriages do create a "community of interests" that includes at least one of these interrelationships. 138 Furthermore, reinterest of a person required to submit" financial disclosure information under the
order. For a discussion of the domiciliary relationship in another context, see note
119 supra.
134. Scrupulous persons, of course, presumably can adequately separate their public and private lives. In the Javits controversy, see note 3 supra, Senator Javits
stated, "In our respective professional activity, my wife and I lead independent lives.
I do not attempt to direct her as to choices and attitudes in her work and she does
not influence me in mine." N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 3.
135. The law still generally presumes such relationships. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
136. See REsrA.TEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 2l(d) (1971). The
U.S. Senate's recent amendments to its financial disclosure rules recognize the separate domicile situation by not requiring disclosure "with respect to the interests of a
spouse living separate and apart from the reporting" Senator. S. Res. 110, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977).
137. Marriage is generally viewed as a civil contract. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STA.T.
§ 42-101 (1974); NEV. REv. SrA.T. § 122.010 (1975). Acknowledgment of emotional
attachment occurs in traditional marriage ceremonies, but these are not required by
state law. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STA.T. § 42-109 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.110
(1975).
138. The law itself, through probate provisions, creates some financial interdependence within all marriages, and few married couples can keep current earnings
completely separate. These financial interrelationships are a particularly potent
threat to the interests protected by conflict of interest legislation.
It can reasonably be assumed that an emotional relationship exists in most marriages that includes some sense of loyalty to the other spouse. If this loyalty were
to conflict with the undivided loyalty a government official is supposed to have ,to
the public, one could not expect the official always to choose the public's interests
over those of the spouse.
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gardless of the true state of affairs, at present the general public
surely perceives that these important ties do exist between spouses.
And that perception indicates that society sees danger in spouses
having the employment combinations discussed above. 180
This analysis suggests that the actual or presumed closeness of
the marital relationship poses a serious threat to the interests protected by conflicts legislation. Recent congressional action to regulate the activities of members' spouses140 is consistent with the general
principles of conflicts of interest theory and the trends of regulation
in this area. 141 But, in utilizing disclosure as the primary regulatory
device, it is not clear that Congress has chosen the most effective
safeguard.
V.

MODES OF REGULATION

Many methods of regulating conflicts of interest might seem appropriate to guard against the dangers identified in this Note, as well
as against numerous other conflicts situations. 142 Six possible regulatory approaches are (1) legislative self-regulation, (2) regulation
by the electorate, (3) regulation by the executive department, (4)
statutory regulation, (5) a code of ethics with internal enforcement,
and (6) a code of ethics with an independent ethics commission.
Legislative self-regulation would probably be based upon an
"honor system" under which each member of Congress would
139. It might be helpful to illustrate this conclusion with hypothetical situations portraying the dangers that warrant protective action. If a member of
Congress had a spouse in a policymaking position on a regulatory commission, even
inadvertent collusion could result in special treatment of a particular case by that
commission to the political benefit of the member of Congress, a result that would
be particularly plausible if a constituent's interests were involved. This possibility.
of special treatment raises questions concerning the undivided loyalty of the regulatory official involved. Furthermore, the ability of that governmental employee to
give the spouse certain agency or departmental information might give the member
of Congress undue power to accomplish goals by working within the system. Lastly,
the potential influence of the governmental employee over the spouse in Congress
on departmental funding and other matters raises questions about the separation of
powers.
Many of these dangers also exist where the spouse is employed in the private
sector. For example, the member of Congress could be influenced to support certain
legislation favorable to the private employer, which raises questions about the preservation of undivided loyalty to the public interest. Also of grave concern is the access
-and potential misuse for personal gain-of the private-sector spouse to information
meant for use solely by the member of Congress. For a discussion of this problem,
see Kalo, Deterring Misuse of Confidential Information: A Proposed Citizen's Action,
72 MICH. L. REV. 1577 (1974). In either of these situations, the mere existence of
the marriage-employment relationship may lead to public cynicism and mistrust about
governmental operations.
140. See notes 101°15 supra and accompanying text.
141. See section II supra.
142. See B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFUCT OF INTEREST LAW 2-4 (1964).
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monitor his or her own actions and inform the Congress whenever
a conflict arises. 143 Because no specific disclosure requirements
would fit into such a scheme, however, no explicit sanctions could
be designed for members who failed to disclose a conflict.
Members of Congress might perceive two principal motivations
for compliance with this system. First, at least if the public is aware
of the self-regulatory scheme·, members of Congress would be induced to try to gain political advantage by demonstrating compliance.144 Second, legislators would be encouraged to avoid the most
blatant breaches. A principal fault of this approach, however, is
that, without the application of pressure to comply by an external
agency, some members of Congress will almost certainly not abide
by whatever conflict standards are established.14 5 The individual
discretion inherent in self-enforcement would also allow each member to make independent and possibly self-serving interpretations of
existing standards.
Under a second method of regulation, the electorate could
determine when unethical conflict of interest situations have arisen
by voting out of office individuals whom they deem to have violated
the norms. This approach would make it unnecessary to define formally society's view of the marital relationship and the conflicts of
interest resulting therefrom. It would also provide a democratic
solution to a politically volatile issue. Despite these advantages,
however, this solution is deficient because it would produce unequal
and sporadic enforcement. This method fails to guarantee any rational standards by which legislators could review their projected actions, 146 and a member of Congress often could not knowingly
comply with standards until his or her job was jeopardized. Furthermore, voters seeking to identify appropriate standards of ethics
by which to measure tlie performance of an incumbent could be
greatly influenced by battling political forces. 147
143. There is precedent for such an approach. The MoNT. CONST. of 1889, art.
V, § 44, stated that a "member who has a p~rsonal or a private interest in any
measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislative assembly, shall disclose
the fact to the house of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon." The
1972 Montana Constitution deleted this provision, but it did provide for the establishment of a code of ethics for state officials. MONT. CONST., art. XIII, § 4.
144. If a conflict were discovered that had not been self-disclosed, the failure of
the member of Congress to report it would create an impression of conscious wrongdoing. Thus, in this regard, self-regulation is similar to enforcement through the
electorate.
145. See Note, supra note 51, at 1211-12. Stronger regulation is called for even
if only a few would violate the standards.
146. Note, supra note 51, at 1214.
147. Id. at 1213. Furthermore, this procedure does not allow the immediate enforcement of ethical standards that might be desirable in dealing with members of
Congress. See Note, supra note 53, at 455. ·
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These problems, along with the importance of a public perception of honesty in government, indicate the need for including specific standards of performance in conflicts of interest regulations. Because of the great public concern about the operation of government,
a relatively innocent act by an official can lead to public uproar.14 8
Definitive standards of conduct should allow a public official to avoid
these minor indiscretions and the accompanying perceptions of
scandal and trials by the press. 149 Furthermore, the existence of explicit standards might increase public confidence in the integrity of
government by encouraging the public official to recognize that his
or her position is a public trust. 150
In a third method of regulation, the executive branch would
serve as a watchdog for conflicts of interest arising in the legislative
branch. 151 Although this approach might be useful at state and local
levels of government, it is of dubious constitutional validity and political legitimacy at the federal level. 152 Informal enforcement
devices are now used occasionally by the executive branch,u 3 and
these "policing" efforts should be encouraged to the extent that their
purpose is more honorable than mere political gain. This fear of
misuse-that political infighting will masquerade as ethical regulation-is the primary drawback to the method. The power of an executive official to challenge conduct of a legislator creates many of
the same problems that conflicts of interest regulation is designed
to remedy. In effect, this scheme would simply transform public
doubt in legislative officials to public doubt in executive officials.
And, when the perceived potential for misuse of power by the regulators is combined with the lack of specificity in standards that would
result from this scheme, it becomes apparent that this enforcement
scheme must be rejected.
Controlling conflicts through statutory regulation would avoid the
148. See Freilich & Larson, supra note 53, at 374; Manning, supra note 53,
at 247-48.
149. In the Marion Javits episode described in note 3 supra, no official body
raised questions about Mrs. Javits' employment and her husband's concurrent service
in the Senate. The questions were raised and, in large part, the standards were set
by the press.
150. As stated in one commentary, "[t]he conscience of each individual provides one of the most effective guides for the conduct of most public officials. However, even public servants acting in good faith need an ascertainable standard as
a basis for evaluating their conduct." Kaufman & Widiss, supra note 97, at 206.
151. See Note, supra note 53, at 453-54.
152. For example, this scheme would raise questions about interference with the
separation of powers.
153. The executive branch can refuse to grant favors to any legislator whose conduct has been questionable. See Note, supra note 53, at 453-54. The executive department can also suggest an investigation of a member of Congress. See Note,
supra note 51, at 1218.
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problems of lack of specificity. 154 One potential objection to this
scheme asserts that statutes create inflexible constraints and that
these rigid restrictions on officeholders might discourage competent
individuals from seeking the positions.155 Some commentators now
qualify their demands for conflicts of interest legislation with the
notion that the statute must produce the least possible deterrence to
those considering public sector employment. 156 The failure to consider this factor would probably tend to have a disproportionate
impact on women, since more often than not the husband is the
public officeholder.157
Probably a stronger objection to regulation by legislation is the
difficulty of drafting a statute to cover all situations involving conflicts of interest. A statute that governed a reasonable range of
spousal conflict situations would tend either to be so vague that it
154. Some commentators have supported the statutory mode of enforcement, at
least for readily definable conflicts. See, e.g., Note, supra note 53, at 456.
155. Justice Holmes once stated that "[u]niversal distrust creates universal incompetence." Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 480 (1913). However,
another commentator has said that, "[w]hile every citizen has a right to become an
officeholder, at times one must subordinate this right to the public good." 70
W. VA. L. REV. 400,400 (1968).
156. See Note, supra note 53, at 450; Note, supra note 99, at 986. There is
evidence that these countervailing considerations played a major role in the drafting
of the existing federal conflict of interest statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970) ).
A report of the House Judiciary Committee noted:
It is also fundamental to the effectiveness of democratic government that,
to the maximum extent possible, the most qualified individuals in society serve
its government. Accordingly, legal protections against conflicts of interest must
be so designed as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to impede the recruitment
and retention by the Government of those men and women who are most qualified to serve it. An essential principle underlying the staffing of our governmental structure is that its employees should not be denied the opportunity, available
to all other citizens, to acquire and retain private economic and other interests,
except where actual or potential conflicts with the responsibility of such employees to the public cannot be avoided.
H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961). The Senate Judiciary Committee praised the bill for properly balancing these interests:
[l]n the interest of facilitating the Government's recruitment of persons with
specialized knowledge and skills for service on a part-time basis, it [the legislation] would limit the impact of those laws on the persons so employed without depriving the Government of protection against unethical conduct on their
part.
S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 3853.
Robert Kennedy, then the Attorney General, saw the Congress as intending the
statutes to bolster the government's recruiting power in areas where overly onerous
restrictions had prevented an expansion of talent. MEMORANDUM OF ATIORNEY
GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY REGARDING CoNFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA.w 87-849, 28 Fed. Reg. 985 (1963), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 201, at 4169
(1970).
157. Over-regulation could discriminate against women because men tend to finish their education and enter the job market prior to their spouses. See TuE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HlGffiiR EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 83-85 (1973). Thus, inflexible regulation could severely limit the job
choices for wives of Congressmen.
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would be of little use in actually regulating conduct or so overbroad
that the chilling effect of over-regulation might occur. 158 Perhaps
more important, both the concept of marital roles and the concept
of conflict of interest are inherently vague, and thus any workable
plan of regulation would need to be flexible. Because statutes by
their very nature tend to be rigid, this form of regulation would ignore some of the relevant variables in the conflict of interest-marital
role milieu. 159 In the final analysis, this inability to deal with the
158. Although we cannot know the amount of undetected conflict of interest in
government, there is empirical evidence that most of the existing statutes are seldom
invoked. In 1958, when Congress promulgated 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218, predecessor
statutes had resulted in the indictment of only a dozen members of Congress in the
preceding century. Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 271. Some cases have
arisen against members of Congress under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1970). See United
States v. Podell, 519 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975) (§ 203);
United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (§ 201); United States v.
Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973) (§ 203). But there is little evidence of any
dramatic rise in the level of enforcement.
Other cases indicate some willingness on the part of the courts and prosecutors
to enforce the federal statutes more strictly against employees of the executive
branch. See United States v. Bailey, 498 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where two federal employees enrolled in part-time legal studies were barred from entering an appearance on behalf of indigent criminal appellants under 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1970)
(prohibiting federal employees from appearing as agents or attorneys on behalf of
anyone in a proceeding to which the United States is a party).
There are two explanations for this hesitancy to enforce the statutes against members of Congress. Some see the Justice Department as extremely reluctant to press
charges against a member of Congress unless the misconduct is very grave. See, e.g.,
Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 271. Others attribute the lack of enforcement
of conflict of interest statutes to the inability to derive clear standards from them.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 97, at 986.
In general, the difficult definitional problems facing a governmental body trying
to enforce ethical restrictions can eviscerate conflict of interest legislation. Professor
Eisenberg has observed that the "existing criminal statutes dealing with conflict situations either are applicable to clearly repugnant behavior or phrased so generally as
to exclude a host of activities that form the real core of the problem." Eisenberg,
supra note 88, at 671. Some commentators see this definitional problem as intractable. See, e.g., Note, State Legislative Conflicts of Interest: An Analysis of the
Alabama Ethics Commission Recommendations, 23 ALA. L. REv. 369, 373 (1971):
There is a growing belief that criminal statutes, and the whole legal apparatus that must be called into play to enforce and give vitality to such
[conflict of interest] statutes may be incapable of coping with the complexity
and subtlety of conflict of interest situations. • . . [I]t is virtually impossible
to specifically define every legislative conflict of interest that may conceivably
arise.
Other commentators are more optimistic. Even the vague definition of conflicts of
interest in the Code of Ethics of Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), was viewed as a breakthrough of sorts in Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 277.
159. It has been argued that overly stringent conflict of interest restrictions place
an unconstitutional burden on the right to marry. See Note, supra note 120, at 75658. Another possible constitutional challenge-based on equal protection-focuses
on the right to work, since statutes might unnecessarily circumscribe the career of
a young professional. See id. at 758-59. Yet another argument asserts that the restrictions create an unconstitutional conclusive presumption about the ethical nature
of the husband-wife employment. See id. at 761-64.
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nuances of the problem requires rejection of this regulatory method.
A fifth regulatory scheme, which would be designed to avoid the
rigidity of a statutory plan, would be based on a code of ethics160
or code of conduct to be enforced by internal ethics committees in
each house of Congress. Both the House and the Senate now
employ this method of regulation. 161 The lack of rigidity in this type
of plan has led to frequent criticism that such codes are by nature
too vague. 162 However, by approaching the provisions in the same
sense as professional canons to be interpreted by an authoritative
group to which the officeholder can submit questions, 168 a code could
establish reasonably specific standards. 164 The problem with this
approach is not with the standards but rather with the enforcement.
Placing the regulatory responsibility on an internal legislative committee creates what has been called "the conflict within the conflict
of interest laws," 165 a reference to the unwillingness and perhaps incapacity of legislators to enforce their own rules of ethical behavior. 166 So long as public confidence in the integrity of legislators
remains low, 167 this approach has little to recommend it. 168
160. One code is found in H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
161. See S. Res. 338, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H. Res. 1013, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966).
162. See Note, supra note 53, at 453.
163. See Note, The Federal Conflicts of Interest Statutes and the Fiduciary Prin.;
ciple, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1507-08 (1961).
164. Codes of ethics may be contained in statutes. Rhodes, Enforcement of
Legislative Ethics: Conflict Within the Conflict of Interest Laws, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS.
373, 384 (1973). The congressional tendency, however, has been to approve ethical
standards by legislative resolution.
165. Id. at 381.
166. Id. This phenomenon has been attributed to at least two behavioral patterns
among legislators. Id. at 379-80. The first is legislative courtesy, a tendency to treat
one's colleagues with considerable deference. D. MATI"HEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND
THEIR WORLD 97-99 (1960). The second is legislative reciprocity, a policy of mutual
assistance among colleagues. Id. at 100.
The hesitancy to enforce legislative ethical regulations was noted some years ago.
See G. GRAHAM, MORALITY IN .AMERICAN PoLmcs 82-% (1952); H. WILSON, CONGRESS: CORRUPTION AND COMPROMISE 1-12 (1951). This hesitancy continues today. The July 1976 reprimand of Rep. Robert Sikes (D.-Fla.) was the first disciplinary action against a House member by the House Ethics Committee since 1969.
The last major investigation of a Senate member by the Senate Ethics Committee was
the 1967 review of the activities of Sen. Thomas Dodd (D.-Conn.). See also note
158 supra.
167. In a recent nationwide Lou Harris survey commissioned through the House
Commission on Administrative Review, only 22 per cent of those surveyed gave Congress a favorable rating, while 64 per cent gave it an unfavorable rating. In the survey's review of perceived ethical standards, those polled rated Congress below consumer action groups, television newscasters, the White House, governors, state legislators, farm organizations, and local government officials. Only corporation executives and organized labor received lower ethical ratings. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1977,
§ A, at 11, col. 1.
168. Since a major objective of conflict of interest legislation is the maintenance
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Combining the flexibility of the code of ethics system with a
different enforcement mechanism yields the most promising solution
to the problem of regulating conflicts of interest. Under this
scheme, enforcement would be placed in an independent ethics commission authorized to respond to all potential conflict situations.100
The commission would, of course, conduct hearings in order to determine the propriety of a specific legislator's activities.170 More important, it would monitor various disclosure documents detailing the
activities of members of Congress and their spouses171 in order to
identify potential conflicts before any actual impropriety occurs or
public confidence is affected. 172 Although some guidance for the
commission's decisionmaking could be provided in the code itself or
in the enabling legislation for the commission, probably the best system would allow the issuance of formal opinions, or even rules, 173
to serve as standards for the future activities of public officials.174
This approach is superior to the regulatory plans previously
considered for dealing with congressional conflict of interest in the
context of marriage. The code and the "collection of ethical principles"175 generated by the commission would provide specific standards by which the general public, as well as those directly affected,
could measure ethical performance. Questions from members of
Congress could be resolved by advisory opinions.176 Because a caseby-case method would be used, there would be less danger of a
chilling effect on activities, the major drawback of the statutory
approach. The individual attention given to each member of Conof public confidence, self-regulation by a body in which the public has little confidence would not be productive.
169. Several sources have suggested this approach. See Note, supra note 51, at
1231; Note, supra note 53, at 457-58. One commentator has called the concept of
the independent commission the "most promising" enforcement tool at the state level.
Rhodes, supra note 164, at 392. He has suggested that the commission should be
composed of both legislators and nonlegislators. Id. at 396-97.
An independent congressional ethics commission was proposed as early as 1951.
. S. Con. Res. 21, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. REC, 2938 (1951), proposed the
formation of an independent advisory commission on ethics in the federal government.
170. See Note, supra note 53, at 457.
171. These financial disclosure documents are discussed in notes 101-13 supra
and accompanying text.
172. See Note, supra note 51, at 1232.
173. Id.
174. Note, supra note 53, at 457. Because there are a myriad of potential marital
employment combinations, each having a very different impact on conflict of interest
considerations, standards of conflict of interest should be developed by the commission rather than be set out in detail in the statute or code. Empowering the commis•
sion to give advisory opinions and make rules would eliminate any problems of fair
notice caused by the statute's lack of specific definitions of unethical activity.
175. Id.
176. For an explanation of the current use of advisory opinions, see note 182
infra.
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gress would help define and detect more subtle conflicts, which now
escape notice. 177 Consistency of action-a major goal of any regulatory plan-should result from the use of the same group of regulators to review every potential conflict over a period of time. Because of its superior efficacy, as well as its primary characteristic of
freedom from political influence, one commentator has viewed the
independent ethics commission as providing the "strongest potential
for impartial and objective administration of legislative codes of
ethics."1 78
Because of its relative freedom from influence, the independent
commission approach would also resolve a major problem found in
Congress' current internal regulation procedure. At present, both
houses of Congress require considerable public financial disclosure
by members and their spouses. 179 At the same time, ethical pronouncements beyond the vague standards articulated in the codes
of conduct of both houses are generally derived from case-by-case
review by the ethics committees.180 There is grave danger in this
arrangement. As previously noted, 181 these internal ethics panels
have been exceedingly hesitant to act. 182 If this pattern continues,
much information will be made available to the public with little accompanying analysis from the committee on whether ethical standards have been violated. Absent this analysis, much of the newly
disclosed information will make spouses of members of Congress
177. See Note, supra note 53, at 458. The incompatible-office cases use a similar
case-by-case approach. See, e.g., Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 265, 148 A. 434, 436
(1930).
178. Rhodes, supra note 164, at 396.
179. See notes 101-13 supra and accompanying text.
180. The Senate's Select Committee on Ethics, however, is now "authorized to
issue interpretative rulings explaining and clarifying the application of any law, the
Code of Official Conduct, or any rule or regulation of the Senate within its jurisdiction." S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1977). In light of its traditional
hesitancy to act, see note 166 and accompanying text, it is unclear whether the committee will avail itself of this power.
181. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
182. In fairness, it must be noted that Congress has attempted to remedy this
problem. For example, the Senate's ethics committee now must render "an advisory
opinion, in writing within a reasonable time, in response to a written requst" by a
Senate member "concerning the application of any law, the Senate Code of Official
Conduct, or any rule or regulation of the Senate within its jurisdiction to a specific
factual situation pertinent to the conduct of proposed conduct of the person seeking
the advisory opinion." The advisory opinion is to be published in the Congressional Record, though the identity of the person who requested the opinion is to be
kept confidential. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1977). However, in
spite of these provisions for confidentiality, members of Congress will probably not
desire to subject themselves to scrutiny by their colleagues. Thus, it is not clear
whether the advisory-opinion procedures as utilized by the internal ethics panel will
be at all effective in promoting the regulation of conflicts of interest.
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quite vulnerable to a standard.less "trial by press. "188 The independent commission would be less hesitant to provide the analysis necessary to vindicate society's interest in regulating conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, the independent commission appears to be the
most responsive body to the changing societal view of the marriage relationship and of the evolving independence of marital partners. Many of the current societal conclusions regarding the
dangers of conflict situations resulting from marriage are based on
a belief that the relationship entails a degree of interdependence that
impairs the judgment of the persons involved. 184 Although this view
seems to describe accurately many marriages today, it is undesirable
to create inflexible restrictions tailored to current views that might
be eroding rapidly. 185 Of all the institutions discussed in this Note
as potential regulators of conflicts of interest, the independent commission, as an administrative body with an adequate staff, is in the
best position to make accurate judgments on this type of rapidly
evolving social issue.
It may be that changing mores about the independence of spouses
make regulation of marital conflicts of interest less necessary. On
the other hand, the increasing tendency for both spouses to be
employed creates more potential conflicts of interest that need
analysis by a body charged with upholding the public interest. In
any event, although Congress has recognized the need for conflicts
of interest regulation in the context of marriage, the modes of regulation adopted by each house are clearly inadequate to deal with this
complex issue effectively.
183. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
As previously noted, see text at note 116 supra, the congressional decision to limit
ethics regulation largely to just financial disclosure may have been a compromise between the desire for stringent conflicts regulation and the increasing recognition of
the autonomy of marital partners. In reality, however, the failure to regulate seem•
ingly unethical activities by members of Congress may result in greater restraints on
the conduct of members and their spouses because of the fear of a "trial by press"
for any questionable activities. In this manner, the compromise may create a formidable, unintended restraint on spousal activity.
184. So long as the public perceives the marital relationship as being sufficiently
close to create possible conflicts of interest, corrective regulation may be needed even
where the actual danger of unethical behavior is small, since one purpose of such
regulation is to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
185. See The American Family, supra note 1, at 35.

